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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
  
 On October 12, 2009, three Philadelphia police 
officers entered a private residence located at 2114 North 
Franklin Street in Philadelphia without a warrant because 
they believed the house to be abandoned.  Upon searching the 
house, they found Khayree Harrison sitting in a recliner with 
a gun, scales, pills, and cocaine base on the table next to him.  
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The police took Harrison into custody, seized the gun, and 
obtained a warrant to seize the rest of the items.  The 
government charged Harrison with possession with intent to 
distribute five grams or more of cocaine base.  Harrison 
moved to suppress the physical evidence on the grounds that 
it had been confiscated pursuant to a search that violated the 
Fourth Amendment.  The District Court held a hearing and 
denied the motion, finding that although Harrison had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the house, the police 
officers were operating under the mistaken but reasonable 
belief that the house was abandoned.  Harrison appealed.  We 
will affirm.   
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
Khayree Harrison lived at 2015 North Eighth Street in 
Philadelphia, but paid Nicole Hawkins $750 a month to use 
the house at 2114 North Franklin Street starting in August 
2009.1
                                              
1  Nicole Hawkins testified at the suppression hearing 
that no one was renting the house at the time of the search.  
Though it did not make a specific finding to this effect, the 
District Court did not credit her testimony.  She was an 
evasive witness, and was unable or unwilling to answer 
simple questions about her ownership interest in the house, 
how she acquired it, who paid rent, and whether she was 
making improvements to it.  As such, finding her incredible 
was not clearly erroneous.  See Anderson v. City of Bessemer 
City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). 
  Harrison spent only one or two nights a week at the 
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2114 North Franklin Street house.  He testified that he had a 
key to the house and entered the home by unlocking the front 
door.  He had paid Nicole Hawkins rent for October 2009. 
 
On October 12, 2009, Philadelphia Police Officer 
Robert McCarthy was driving around the neighborhood in a 
marked police car when he spotted a dirt bike on the side of 
the road.  He pulled over, retrieved the bike’s vehicle 
identification number, began a search for the owner’s 
information on his computer, and drove away.  About ten 
minutes later, he learned that the bike was reported stolen.  
He went back to get the bike, but it was already gone.  Later 
that day, he spotted the same bike being ridden by an 
unknown male.  Officer McCarthy did not follow or 
apprehend him at that time.  Around 8 p.m. that evening, 
Officer McCarthy was joined by Officer Matthew McCarthy, 
his cousin, and Officer Joseph O’Malley.  They decided to 
walk through the yards between Franklin and 8th Streets to 
see if they could find the stolen bike. They spotted the bike in 
the backyard of 2114 North Franklin Street. The officers 
walked around to the front yard, where they noticed that the 
front door was open. They also saw candlelight through a 
boarded-up window on the first floor.  Believing the house to 
be abandoned, the three officers walked in the front door and 
opened the door on their immediate left.  They did not knock 
or announce their presence.   
 
The officers saw Harrison sitting in a recliner chair.  
Next to him, he had a gun, scales, pills, and an unknown 
substance.  Seeing the officers, Harrison ran out of the room 
and into the basement.  The officers followed and took him 
into custody.  They then contacted an Officer Reynolds, also 
of the Philadelphia Police Department, and had him prepare a 
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search warrant for the house.  In preparing the warrant, 
Officer Reynolds discovered that Nicole Hawkins Investment 
Company owned the property.   
 
At the suppression hearing, the officers testified to the 
condition of the house and the District Court credited their 
testimony.  The officers testified consistently that 2114 North 
Franklin Street was in a state of constant and severe disrepair.  
Specifically, Officer Robert McCarthy testified that the 
backyard was full of trash and there were “boards on the door 
and the window.”  Appendix. (“App.”) at A26.  The yard was 
covered in weeds and generally untended.  There was nothing 
covering the windows on the second floor.  On the front of 
the house, they observed that the two bottom windows were 
boarded up with plywood, there was trash all over the yard, 
and the front door was unlocked and ajar.   
 
Officer Matthew McCarthy, who had been at the house 
many times before, testified that “the front door [was] never 
locked,” App. at A47, and was always open.  In fact, he 
seemed unsure of whether the door could be locked.  He also 
testified that the condition of the house never changed.  It 
remained in the same state of disrepair each time he saw it.   
 
Officer McCarthy also testified about the condition of 
the house’s interior.  He said that he entered 2114 North 
Franklin Street several times in the months leading up to 
October 12, 2009, although he never made any arrests or 
filled out any incident reports.   He described the house as a 
“known drug residence,” and said that one would often “see 
drug users and dealers hanging out outside, going in and out 
the front door all day long.” App. at A46.  He observed this 
activity “all summer.” App. at A49.  Prior to October, he had 
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entered the house to kick people out numerous times.  He 
testified that 
 
The whole house was filled with drug 
paraphernalia all over the house, trash.  The 
front door is never locked.  It’s always open.  
The upstairs has a single mattress in the front 
room of the building.  Drug bags all over the 
place, drug paraphernalia.  Mostly crack bags, 
some heroin bags.  The first floor, again, trash 
all over the place.  The whole house smells like 
urine.  People are often in there sleeping.  There 
is feces in both the tub and the toilet that is 
never flushed because there is no water in the 
house.  Again, I go in there routinely just to 
kick people out, just to keep them out of the 
area.   
 
App. at A47.  Officer McCarthy also said that he had no 
reason to believe there was electricity in the house.  
Ultimately, he did not think anyone could actually be living 
there, as “it did not seem habitable.”  App. at A48.  He last 
entered the house two or three weeks prior to the search that 
is at issue here.  
 
B. 
 
The grand jury returned an indictment that charged 
Harrison with possession with intent to distribute five grams 
or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); commission of that offense within 
1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860; and 
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possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).  
 
Prior to trial, Harrison filed a motion to suppress the 
physical evidence against him.  After a hearing, the District 
Court denied the motion.  It held that while the property was 
not abandoned, “[b]ased on the appearance of the property 
and the officers’ knowledge of the property’s history, the 
police acted reasonably in entering the property to 
investigate.”  App. at A12.   
 
After a jury trial, Harrison was found guilty of 
possession with intent to distribute but was acquitted on the 
other charges.  The District Court sentenced him to 62 
months’ imprisonment.  This timely appeal followed.  The 
District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
II. 
 
We review factual determinations made on a motion to 
suppress for clear error and legal determinations de novo.  
United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2011).  
The proponent of a motion to suppress bears the burden of 
proving that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
place searched and that the search was illegal.  Kennedy, 638 
F.3d at 163.  Because the District Court denied Harrison’s 
suppression motion on the grounds that the search was 
permissible, “we must review the propriety of the warrantless 
search that led to the discovery of incriminating evidence.”  
United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 2005).  
In so doing, we construe the record in the light most favorable 
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to the government.  United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 
(3d Cir. 2002).   
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that “[t]he 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”  
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).  “It remains a 
cardinal principle that searches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  At issue here is the 
abandonment exception, which we consider in the context of 
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule typically 
applied to evidence seized without a warrant.  See United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (1984) (“[W]here the 
officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, excluding the 
evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in 
any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that . . . the 
officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act 
in similar circumstances” (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)).  We first consider the contours of 
abandonment.   
 
 A warrantless search of property is permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment where the owner has abandoned his 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that property.  United 
States v. Fulani, 368 F.3d 351, 354 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960)).  This 
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determination must be made from an objective viewpoint, and 
proof of intent to abandon must be established by clear and 
unequivocal evidence.  Id.  We look at the totality of the facts 
and circumstances in making such a determination.  See id.; 
McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 354, 359 (8th Cir. 2011).  In 
most cases, disclaiming ownership or physically relinquishing 
the property is sufficient to establish abandonment.  United 
States v. Liu, 180 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 
We note that, “abandonment for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment differs from abandonment in property law; here 
the analysis examines the individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy, not his property interest in the item.”2
                                              
2  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States 
v. Jones, --- U.S. ---, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) (finding that a 
common law trespass constitutes a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment) does not alter our analysis.  The question before 
the Court in Jones was different than the question currently 
before us.  As Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence, 
the Court was grappling with the question of when a search 
occurred, which is not at issue here.  It is undisputed that the 
officers’ entry constituted a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.   
  Fulani, 368 
F.3d at 354 (citing United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 
1302 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 
538, 546 (4th Cir. 2005).  Thus, our holding will not turn on 
whether the house was abandoned under the common law of 
property.  “Indeed, there is a real difference between 
property-law and constitutional abandonment, for courts have 
repeatedly found abandonment for constitutional purposes in 
situations that might not support a finding of abandonment in 
the common-law understanding.” United States v. Redmon, 
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138 F.3d 1109, 1127 (7th Cir. 1998) (Flaum, J., concurring) 
(en banc).  Therefore, the fact that for common law purposes 
real property cannot be abandoned, see e.g., Pocono Springs 
Civic Assoc., Inc. v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233, 236 (Pa. 
Super Ct. 1995), is not dispositive.  See United States v. 
Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 902 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[W]e hold that 
local law of real property does not provide the exclusive basis 
upon which to decide Fourth Amendment questions.”).  
Rather, it will inform our inquiry.  See Stevenson, 396 F.3d at 
546.   As such, what the common law property rules suggest 
is that abandonment of real property under the Fourth 
Amendment is difficult, but not impossible, to establish.    
 
The home occupies a sacrosanct place in our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 
586, 603 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  “Privacy and 
security in the home are central to the Fourth Amendment’s 
guarantees as explained in our decisions and as understood 
since the beginning of the Republic.”  Id.   
 
Nevertheless, a person can lose his reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his real property if he abandons it.  
Thus, a person can, as he can with any other property, 
sufficiently manifest an intent to abandon his house.  See 
McKenney, 635 F.3d at 359; United States v. Levasseur, 816 
F.2d 37, 44 (2d Cir 1987); Mann v. Cannon, 731 F.2d 54, 59 
(1st Cir. 1984) (finding that a warrantless search of a doctor’s 
house was permitted when the “the house had become open to 
the public, vandalized, uninhabitable, and from appearances 
virtually abandoned.”); United States v. Callabrass, 607 F.2d 
559, 565 (2d Cir. 1979) (“Thus it appears to all intents and 
purposes that appellant abandoned the house and the property 
in it.”) (Oakes, J., dissenting); United States v. Wilson, 472 
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F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1972); see also, People v. Taylor, 655 
N.W.2d 291 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Hunter, 2012 
WL 1868393, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 24, 2012); 
State v. Linton, 812 A.2d 382, 383-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2002) (permitting a search of a house that “had all the 
indicia of abandonment”); State v. McKinney, 637 S.E.2d 
868, 871 (N.C. 2006) (“A reasonable expectation of privacy 
in real property may be surrendered, however, if the property 
is permanently abandoned.”); Wayne LaFavre Search and 
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.3(e) (4th 
Ed. 2011) (“It has often been held that if a defendant has in 
fact abandoned the place where he formerly resided, then he 
may not have suppressed from evidence what the police find 
on those premises after the time of abandonment.”); cf. 
United States v. Wyler, 502 F. Supp. 959, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980); State v. Carter, 54 So. 3d 1093, 1095 (La. 2011) (“We 
agree with the premise of the state’s argument . . . that an 
individual does not possess a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in an abandoned home and therefore may not 
complaint about a warrantless entry of the premises by the 
police.”).   
 
Even the framework established by a plurality of the 
Supreme Court for analyzing searches of burned down houses 
implicitly recognizes that a residence can be abandoned.  In 
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 289, 293 (1984), the 
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a warrantless search of 
a home after a devastating fire.  In the early morning, a fire 
broke out at the home of Raymond and Emma Clifford.  Id. at 
289.  By 1:00 p.m. that day, the fire was extinguished and a 
work crew was pumping water out of the home.  Id. at 290.  A 
fire department inspector entered the home without a warrant 
and searched it, finding evidence of arson.  Id.  The 
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constitutionality of the warrantless search, a plurality of the 
Court held, can turn on “whether there are legitimate privacy 
interests in the fire-damaged property.”  Id. at 292; see also 
United States v. Francis, 327 F.3d 729, 735 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(finding that “the existence of legitimate privacy interests,” to 
be an important factor in determining whether a post-fire 
warrantless search of a house was permitted).  Expectations 
of privacy “may remain” in fire-damaged homes because 
“[p]eople may go on living in their homes or working in their 
offices after a fire.  Even when that is impossible, private 
effects often remain.” Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 
U.S. 499, 505 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The plurality enumerated several factors that should be 
analyzed in determining whether a legitimate expectation of 
privacy remained: “the type of property, the amount of fire 
damage, the prior and continued use of the premises, and, in 
some cases, the owner’s efforts to secure [the home] against 
intruders.”  Id.; see also United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 
800, 805-6 (1st Cir. 1996).  In other words, there are 
circumstances in which the combination of fire damage and 
an owner’s own acts so exposes a home to the outside world 
that the owner has relinquished his legitimate expectation of 
privacy in that home. 3
                                              
3 Harrison’s reliance on the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Wilson v. Health and Hospital Corp. 620 F.2d 1201 (7th 
Cir. 1980) is misplaced.  There, one-half of a duplex was 
burned down and effectively left open and unsecured.  
Wilson, 620 F.2d at 1206.  The District Court determined that 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy because the 
house was so exposed to the outside world that no one would 
have had an objective expectation of privacy in the property.  
Id. at 1208.  The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that the 
  Cf. Clifford, 464 U.S. at 292.    
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The same logic applies to a person’s abandonment of 
his house.  A person can, through his own acts or omissions, 
manifest an intent to relinquish his legitimate expectation of 
privacy in his real property, as the same test applies 
regardless of the nature of the property.  This is, however, a 
difficult standard to meet, and one that requires a careful 
analysis of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case.  
Before the government may cross the threshold of a home 
without a warrant, there must be clear, unequivocal and 
unmistakable evidence that the property has been abandoned.  
Only then will such a search be permitted.  
 
B. 
 
 In this case, it is undisputed that the house was not 
actually abandoned and that Harrison, as a renter, possessed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the property.  Therefore, 
the only issue before us is whether the police officers’ belief 
that the house was abandoned justified their warrantless entry.   
                                                                                                     
search of the house did not qualify under either the open 
fields or plain view doctrines.  Id. at 1209.  However, the 
Seventh Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing and 
explicitly acknowledged that upon a fuller record “it may well 
be . . . that the plaintiff had effectively abandoned his right to 
exclude.”  Id. at 1213.  It also acknowledged that “the open 
and unsecure condition of the premises . . . would point away 
from a reasonable expectation [of privacy].”  Id.  Thus, 
Wilson does not stand for the proposition that a person cannot 
abandon a residence.   
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The law does not require that police officers always be 
factually correct; it does demand, however, that they always 
be reasonable.   Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 
(1990). “Consequently, a reasonable mistake of fact does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.”  United States v. Delfin-
Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also United States v. Elliott, 50 F.3d 180, 
185-86 (2d Cir. 1995).  In deciding what is reasonable, a 
court is to apply an objective standard, looking at whether 
“the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the search was 
permissible.  Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).    
 
 Unlike a mistake of fact, a search conducted pursuant 
to a police officer’s mistake as to the governing law, even if 
reasonable, is not permitted under the Fourth Amendment.  
Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 397, 399 (“[A] mistake of law by 
the seizing officer will render a traffic stop per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment” unless facts are 
offered that “show that the identified law was actually 
broken.”).   
 
 Harrison contends that the police officers made a 
mistake of law when they entered 2114 North Franklin Street.  
Their mistake, according to Harrison, was that they assumed a 
house could be abandoned at all.  Thus, the argument goes, it 
is irrelevant whether the officers were reasonable in their 
belief.  We disagree.  First, as discussed above, a house can 
be abandoned for Fourth Amendment purposes, and thus the 
officers did not make a mistake of law.  Second, the officers 
made a mistake of fact.  Their observations of the property 
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over time suggested to them that whoever once had an 
expectation of privacy in the property had since effectively 
relinquished it.  As they testified before the District Court, the 
police officers believed that the house was unfit for human 
habitation and that no one lived there.  This is a mistake of 
fact, not of law.  In essence, the officers were mistaken in 
their belief that there existed no person who had a remaining 
expectation of privacy in the property.  Thus, under our case 
law governing mistakes of fact, the officers’ warrantless 
search of the house was permissible if their mistake was 
reasonable. 
 
C. 
 
1. 
 
 Before turning to a discussion of the reasonableness of 
the officers’ mistake, we must deal with the threshold inquiry 
of what information we may rely upon in deciding the 
question.  Before us, Harrison contends that we should 
exclude any observations Officer Matthew McCarthy made of 
the interior condition of the house because each entry he 
made was without a warrant in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The government contends that Harrison failed 
to raise this argument before the District Court and that it is 
waived.  We agree.  It is well-settled that suppression 
arguments raised for the first time on appeal are waived 
absent good cause.  United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 182 
(3d Cir. 2008).   Indeed, “[a] party waives any Rule 12(b)(3) 
defense, objection, or request not raised” prior to trial.  Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 12(e); see also Rose, 538 F.3d at 180. 
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 Harrison’s counsel neither referenced nor objected to 
the officer’s prior entries in his initial memorandum of law in 
support of his motion to suppress.  The government, however, 
made explicit reference to the officer’s prior entries in its 
opposition brief.  Thus, at a minimum, Harrison’s counsel 
was on notice that the government would be introducing and 
relying upon such evidence in opposing his motion.  
Nevertheless, no reply was made.  
 
 At the hearing, Harrison did not object when the 
government questioned the police officers about their prior 
entries, did not build a record supporting his argument that 
the facts did not justify the initial entries under an 
abandonment theory, and did not make any legal arguments 
relevant to abandonment during his colloquy with the District 
Court.  Though he referenced Officer McCarthy’s initial 
entries, he confined his oral argument solely to the question 
of whether the evidence should be suppressed because it 
would deter future police misconduct under the Supreme 
Court’s balancing test in Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 
135 (2009).  Such an argument presupposes that the search 
violated the Fourth Amendment and represents a different and 
distinct theory of suppression.  
 
  Thus, by operation of Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, this argument is waived absent good 
cause.  Rose, 538 F.3d at 179-80.  Harrison presents no 
reason, and we see none, why good cause exists for the failure 
to raise this issue before the District Court.  Because this 
argument is waived, we will include the entirety of Officer 
Matthew McCarthy’s testimony regarding the interior of the 
house.  
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2. 
 
Turning to the central question of this appeal, we 
conclude that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the 
officers were reasonable in their mistake of fact.  The police 
officers testified consistently that the exterior of 2114 North 
Franklin Street was in a state of severe disrepair.  There was 
trash strewn about, the lawn was overgrown with weeds, and 
the windows on both levels were either boarded up or 
exposed.4
 
  The front door was left open, and the lock may 
have been broken.  However, this alone would not have been 
sufficient to find the officers’ mistake reasonable.   
It is unreasonable to assume that a poorly maintained 
home is an abandoned home.  A one-time look at 2114 North 
Franklin Street in its dilapidated condition would not justify 
the police entering it without a warrant because a reasonably 
cautious officer would only assume that the person who 
occupied the home did not maintain it as they should, not that 
they had clearly manifested an intent to relinquish their 
                                              
4  We note that boarded-up windows can cut against 
finding that the house was abandoned in that it suggests an 
individual is taking steps to secure the property. Conversely, 
the always open front door weighs in favor of finding that the 
house was abandoned as it suggests an individual is not 
taking steps to secure the property or to exclude others.   As 
the Supreme Court noted in Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 
287, 289 (1984), such efforts must be considered as part of an 
inquiry into whether an individual relinquishes his 
expectation of privacy in his property.    
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expectation of privacy in the house.5
   
  There simply is no 
“trashy house exception” to the warrant requirement. 
Here, however, the police officers knew more.  
Specifically, Officer Matthew McCarthy knew that the inside 
of the house matched the rundown condition of the exterior.  
It was a known drug den.  There were no furnishings other 
than a single mattress on the top floor, human waste filled the 
bathtub and toilets, and there was no evidence of running 
water or electricity.  During his prior entries, Officer 
McCarthy observed squatters, who claimed no right to be 
there. The house was so dilapidated that the officers believed 
it was not fit for human habitation.6
 
  This, combined with the 
exterior condition of the property, is probative evidence of 
abandonment.  
                                              
5   There may be situations where it is ambiguous to a 
reasonable officer whether a dilapidated house is abandoned.  
In such cases, the officer would need to make further 
inquiries into the property’s status.  See United States v. Cos, 
498 F.3d 1115, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that a duty 
to investigate further is triggered when the facts known to the 
officers are ambiguous, such as when it is unclear whether 
someone has the authority to consent to a search.).  Such an 
inquiry was unnecessary here, because, given the officer’s 
extensive knowledge of the home and its history, the facts 
seemed unambiguous.  Thus, no duty to inquire further was 
triggered.   
 
6  Indeed, even Harrison himself, despite paying nearly a 
thousand dollars a month to rent the property, did not live 
there.   
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The Eighth Circuit in McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 
354 (8th Cir. 2011) similarly concluded that when both the 
exterior and the interior of a house are in an extreme state of 
disrepair suggesting that it is uninhabitable, it is reasonable 
for officers to assume the house is abandoned.  The Eighth 
Circuit observed:  
 
The officers found the house in disrepair, with 
an unkempt yard and a fence that was 
incomplete and falling apart. There were no 
vehicles parked in the driveway. No one 
responded when the officers knocked on the 
front door, and the back door was open three or 
four inches. Through the open door, the officers 
could see into the kitchen, where the cabinets 
were open and empty, the refrigerator was open, 
empty, and pulled away from the wall, and there 
was no furniture or personal effects. There were 
no lights on, sounds from appliances, or other 
indications that the house had electrical power. 
In light of these facts, it was reasonable for 
Harrison and Pollreis to conclude that the house 
was abandoned.  
 
McKenney, 635 F.3d at 359.  To the Eighth Circuit, the police 
were reasonable in concluding, upon seeing the decaying 
house, and “open and empty” drawers and appliances, that the 
house was abandoned.   It was as if some time ago someone 
had packed up in haste never to return.  See id.  The officers 
could only have reached such a conclusion once they 
observed the condition of the property’s interior.  Without 
those additional facts, it is unlikely that the officers’ belief 
would have been reasonable.   
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Ours is an even stronger case for abandonment than 
McKenney, because here the officers had knowledge of the 
property’s history.  This knowledge—particularly their 
observation of its unchanging, uninhabitable condition over 
several months—dispositively bolsters the reasonableness of 
the officers’ belief.  Based on the record, we assume that 
Officer Matthew McCarthy began observing the property in 
approximately June 2009.7
 
  Thus, he had about four months 
of observations of the house’s condition before he entered it 
in October.   
It is one thing to infer that a person has abandoned his 
expectation of privacy in his home based on a one-time 
observation.  It is quite another to observe that same property 
in that same dilapidated condition with a front door that is 
“always open” over the course of several months.  Over time, 
the inference that the property has been “thrown away” 
becomes significantly stronger.  Given the combination of the 
rundown exterior, the “always open” door, the trashed 
interior, and the extended observations over time, the police 
officers were reasonable in their mistaken belief that the 
house was abandoned.  Based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the warrantless search was permitted under the 
Fourth Amendment and the District Court did not err when it 
denied Harrison’s motion to suppress.  
 
 
 
                                              
7  Officer McCarthy testified that he observed the house 
over the course of months, noting that he observed known 
drug dealers entering the home all summer.  This suggests he 
entered the home from around June through October.   
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III. 
 
 The District Court’s order denying the motion to 
suppress will be affirmed.  
